The failure of socialist republicanism in the Irish revolution and its aftermath - Part 8


A Sinn Féin poster from the 1918 general election. Picture from www.dail100.ie.

 
CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS POST.

The 1918 general election

It is argued by some historians that the Irish Labour Party’s decision not to stand in the general
election of 1918 was triggered by the fact that what would have been a ‘war election’, involving
issues such as opposition to conscription – to which Labour was already deeply committed –
became, after 11 November, with the signing of the Armistice between the allies and Germany, a
‘peace election’, in which national independence now appeared to be the main issue before the
country. However, according to newspaper reports of the manifesto which was published by the
Irish Trade Union Congress and Labour Party in September 1918, prior to the decision to withdraw
from the electoral race, even at this time, with the war still ongoing, Labour had considered the issue
of national independence to be the primary question over which the election would be fought. The
Freeman’s Journal of 28 September quoted a passage from Labour’s manifesto which lamented that,
while Labour would have preferred the election to be about “questions directly connected with the
social and economic condition of the people”, the party recognised that it “must take into
consideration the realities of the situation in the abnormal conditions now prevailing, and the
realities today are the war and its reactions. Among these reactions Ireland’s national claim stands
out boldly demanding satisfaction”.[1]

It would seem, then, that Labour’s decision not to field candidates in the election was not a reaction
to the armistice of November 1918. According to Michael Laffan the decision was motivated, in part,
by a reluctance to take sides on the question of independence for fear of alienating unionist
workers, particularly in the heavily industrialised north-east of Ireland.[2] The election manifesto of
September 1918, however, indicates that Labour was overtly committed to Irish self-determination.
The manifesto insists on Ireland’s “right to decide its own form of government, to choose its own
Sovereignty, to determine its own destinies without limitations”. The British government is seen as
the obstacle to the achievement of this right, and this is spoken of in terms almost redolent of
military occupation: “We assert before the world that Ireland is denied this right by the power of
armed force; and we call upon the democracies to make good their professions by their actions, and
set free the Irish nation from its involuntary bondage.”[3] (Laffan acknowledges that “Labour offered
a radical programme”, but does not refer to the manifesto’s support for self-determination.[4])

In 1918, the Irish Labour Party was still new to electoral politics, and had only ever fought one by
election.[5] Furthermore, most working-class people would not have been able to vote in general
elections prior to 1918. As a consequence, it is difficult to gauge the level of support that existed for
the Irish Labour Party and that might have translated into votes had the party decided to put
forward candidates in the 1918 election. It is possible that Labour’s decision not to stand in the
election derived from a desire to allow Sinn Féin as strong a chance as possible to achieve a landslide
victory and thereby stake a powerful claim for national independence – as indeed did happen, with
Sinn Féin winning 73 out of the 105 available seats in Ireland. However, the election manifesto also states that “the representatives of the Irish Labour Party shall refuse to attend the House of
Commons” (although there was a clause allowing the party to change its position on this).[6] It being
the case that, like Sinn Féin, Labour had adopted a policy of abstention from Westminster, it is
difficult to argue that, had they participated and won seats in the election, they would not have
been able to co-operate with Sinn Féin in forming the first Dáil and, ultimately, orchestrating the
War of Independence that broke out the following year.

Indeed, the the idea of a joint electoral platform involving both Labour and Sinn Féin had been
mooted in 1917, at the Mansion House conference organised by Count Plunkett. Easter Rising
veteran Sean Milroy had proposed the creation of a body called ‘the Executive Council of the Irish
National Alliance’ (a name, incidentally, which had been used before by an organisation set up at the
‘Irish Nationalist Convention’ in Chicago, 22 years previously[7]) involving Sinn Féin, the Irish Labour Party and various other national organisations including the Irish Volunteers, which would “make arrangements for contesting Parliamentary and other elections in Ireland and presenting Ireland’s case at the Peace Conference”.[8] The proposal was never fully implemented, however, and a formal alliance between Labour and Sinn Féin never actually came about. Within a short time, Plunkett’s political organisation, consisting of a network of ‘Liberty Clubs’, was to be effectively submerged by the rising tide of Sinn Féin’s popularity and success.

One possible explanation for Labour’s decision not to fight the election was suggested by Liam Cahill. This is the idea that Labour, knowing that many of its natural supporter base, ie. trade union
members, were intending to vote for Sinn Féin, did not wish to alienate that large section of the
working class by putting up rival candidates (Laffan, too, acknowledges this factor as playing a role in Labour’s decision not to stand[9]).[10] Evidence for the displeasure of many trade unionists at the idea of Labour standing in the election is provided by an article carried in the Irish independent on 30
September in which it was reported that “Kilkenny Trades Council and Labour League passed a
resolution unanimously disapproving of Irish Labour entering the field at the General Election as a
separate political Party, being convinced that by doing so they would be doing the movement an
immense disservice to itself and the country”.[11] The same newspaper, reporting on the special
session of the ILPTUC, held at the Mansion House in Dublin, in which the decision not to participate
in the election was taken, mentions the comments of a Mr Cronin of Limerick, who “assured the
Congress that Labour men said to him they would vote Sinn Féin no matter what happened”.[12] The
withdrawal motion itself was greeted with applause, and Thomas McPartlin of the ITUC national
executive, who seconded the motion, stated that “he had no consideration for any political party,
but was solely influenced by the amount of good that could be done by keeping the workers united
in the coming fight for Ireland”.[13] The argument that Labour’s withdrawal from the election was
inspired by the idea of “keeping the workers united in the coming fight for Ireland” – in other words,
by an unwillingness to upset trade unionists who wanted to see a Sinn Féin landslide - seems
plausible, given the problems with the previously examined alternative explanations, especially given the momentum behind the rise of Sinn Féin since 1916 and its image as an organisation whose
sole and dedicated aim was full independence from Britain – the very question over which, with the
issue of conscription now out of the way – the election was essentially being fought.

Certainly, Labour’s decision to withdraw from the election was portrayed as one which clarified and
simplified the issues – or rather the issue – at stake. The Nenagh Guardian put it in particularly stark
terms: “On the one side there will now be the cause of Ireland and its claim to self-determination.
Against that cause there will be arrayed all the forces of reaction, corruption, provincialism, and
greed”. This latter description was probably intended to portray the Irish Parliamentary Party, now
discredited in the eyes of many Irish nationalists along with the notion of home rule which had been
the subject of so much hope and rejoicing only five or six years previously.[14]

The Nenagh Guardian article also hints at the potential reward that lay in store for Irish Labour in
return for “leaving the field free at the coming election”. The decision is described as “one that can
never be forgotten” and the claims of Irish Labour “to adequate representation in the administration
of the country” are described as “unanswerable”. Ireland, it is stated “never can be built up socially
and industrially without their active support and co-operation”.[15] It is possible that the promise of
reward from a future Sinn Féin administration may have influenced Labour’s decision. If so,
however, this would perhaps be an example of the conservatism and over-cautiousness on the part
of the Labour leadership which was alluded to by Adrian Grant. The idea of merely being adequately
represented in government, and of providing “support and co-operation” in Ireland’s industrial and social growth, seems like something of a climb-down for a party which, only a month before the election, had claimed in its manifesto to “adopt the principles of the Russian Revolution”.[16]

CONTINUED IN NEXT POST
    
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[1] ‘Labour electoral programme: policy of abstention for the present’, Freeman’s Journal, 28 September 1918.

[2] Laffan, Resurrection of Ireland, pp. 157-159.

[3] Irish Labour Party Election Manifesto 1918 quoted in ‘Irish Labour and abstention: plans for the election’, Irish Independent, 28 September 1918.

[4] Laffan, Resurrection of Ireland, p. 159.

[5] Ibid., p. 157.

[6] Irish Labour Party Election Manifesto 1918 quoted in ‘Irish Labour and abstention: plans for the election’, Irish Independent, 28 September 1918.

[7] ‘Irish National Alliance: to secure the independence of the emerald isle’, Los Angeles Herald, 27 September 1895.

[8] ‘Over 100 priests: overflow crowds at Plunkett conference’, Evening Herald, 19 April 1917.

[9] Laffan, Resurrection of Ireland, 158-159

[10] Cahill, Forgotten Revolution, pp. 20-21

[11] ‘Irish Labour and the election’, Irish Independent, 30 September 1918.

[12] ‘The policy of Irish Labour. No contests; a national conference’, Irish Independent, 2 November 1918.

[13] ‘Irish Labour Congress: seaman’s delegates expelled, withdrawal of parliamentary candidates’, Derry Journal, 4 November 1918.

[14] ‘Country before party: Irish Labour and Irish freedom’, Nenagh Guardian, 9 November 1918.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Irish Labour Party Election Manifesto 1918 quoted in ‘Irish Labour and abstention: plans for the election’, Irish Independent, 28 September 1918.

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