The failure of socialist republicanism in the Irish revolution and its aftermath - Part 4


Front page of the Evening Herald (Dublin) during the lockout of 1913. From National Library of Ireland - 1916 Exhibition.

Continued from previous post.


Some questions

Each of the above three interpretations undoubtedly contains some element of the truth about why the socialist republican movement did not achieve its desired outcome of establishing a 'workers' republic' in Ireland. However, there are a number of key questions which arise from them, an analysis of which will be helpful towards gaining a better understanding of why events turned out as they did. The first of these is the question of whether or not the general public in Ireland at the time of the Irish revolution was sufficiently receptive to socialist ideas to make the idea of an Irish socialist republic a viable one. If it was not, then the first interpretation – or at least that part of it which sees it as inevitable that radical socialism could not have successfully competed for popularity with nationalism during this period - would seem to be an accurate – though perhaps only partial - account of why the movement failed to achieve its goals.

The second question is that of whether, and to what extent, the values of the nationalist movement in Ireland inevitably precluded support for any strongly socialistic policy objectives. This might be due to class factors; the evidence might indicate, for example, that Irish nationalism was essentially inspired by middle-class actors and attitudes. On the other hand, it could be that the nationalist movement was strongly associated with, or influenced by, adherence to the Roman Catholic faith, and that this association was detrimental to the possibility of a powerful socialist tendency within the movement. If the evidence points to an inability of Irish nationalism to accommodate radical socialism within its political or ideological framework, then a powerful reason for the failure of the socialist republican movement to achieve its objectives will be evident. Radical socialists should never have allied themselves with advanced nationalists and should, instead, have waged a distinct campaign to overthrow capitalism in Ireland, without regard to the activities of Sinn Féin or the IRA. It is impossible to know what the outcome of such a policy would have been but, given the conditions described above, it would have been the more rational course of action for the militant left in Ireland during the period in question. Should the evidence point to the plausibility of this scenario, that would be a vindication of the second interpretation, which sees socialism and radical nationalism as antithetical to, or at least incompatible with, each other.

The final question is, would a decision by the leadership of the Irish Labour Party to contest the general election in 1918 have been viable, or would it have split the Labour movement along sectarian lines, or between those who wished to retain the union with Britain and those who favoured complete separation? If it can be argued that Labour would have been able to achieve a significant level of success in the election, then the idea that the socialist republican movement would have been more successful had Labour taken such a decision is certainly plausible. Labour might have held seats in the first Dáil and thereby had more of a say in the prosecution of the Anglo-Irish war and in the decision-making process regarding the Anglo-Irish treaty. Linked to this question is that of whether it would have been feasible for the Labour leadership to have opposed that treaty. Would there have been sufficient support within the Labour party and the unions for such a move, and what level of support would an anti-treaty Labour movement have found amongst the general public? A further question on this theme is that of whether responsibility for the failure of the various socialist republican formations which existed after the establishment of the Free State, to come together under one umbrella in order to fight their cause more effectively, can plausibly be laid at the feet of the leaders of those formations? Contingent on the answers to these questions is the plausibility of the third interpretation of the failure of socialist republicanism, that which regards poor decision making on the part of the leaders of the movement as being largely responsible for that failure.


Method

To help answer these questions, it will be useful to look at reports from the local press in Ireland, from the first three decades of the twentieth century (although some use will also be made of other documents, such as the witness statements held by the Republic of Ireland’s Bureau of Military History and even the 1891 papal encyclical Rerum Novarum). By this method, it will be possible to get a general overview of the reception accorded to men like James Larkin and James Connolly, and of the level of interest in, and enthusiasm for, their ideas. It will also be helpful to get an overview of the position of the Roman Catholic Church ‘on the ground’ in Ireland (as opposed to merely the formal position of the top levels of the Church hierarchy) in regard to socialism, and of the degree of influence that the Church had over the political views of the population in Ireland, whether or not they were actively involved in politics. This will give an idea of the mood of the country in regard to radical socialism.

It will be important, also, to look at how socialist ideas were viewed in the north-east of Ireland, particularly in Belfast, for it was here that Ireland's “most advanced and deeply organized working class”[1] was located. Nationalism was less popular in the north-east of Ulster than it was in most of the rest of Ireland (as indicated by the 1918 general election results) but to answer the question of whether there was an appetite for socialism in Ireland at this time it will be necessary to examine the popularity of specifically socialist ideas here.

North-east Ulster will also be an important focus in addressing the question of whether a more overt commitment to advanced nationalism would have split the Labour movement, alienating those Labour supporters who were not in favour of independence from Britain. To establish the extent of Labour's support amongst those who were opposed to independence it will be necessary to look at contemporary accounts from Belfast and the north-east generally.

By looking at newspaper reports from 1918, it will also be possible to get an insight into the attitudes of the leadership and membership of the Labour movement towards the rapid growth in popularity of Sinn Féin, and of advanced nationalism in general, and to gain a better understanding of Labour’s decision not to fight the general election that took place in that year. Similarly, reports from 1921 and 1922 will be useful in tracing the development of Labour’s attitude to the Anglo-Irish treaty, the establishment of the Irish Free State and the drift towards civil war.

Finally, it will be helpful to look at reports from the post-civil war era in Ireland. Amongst other things, this will facilitate an examination of the reasons behind the republican socialist movement’s failure to establish a unified front, and the extent to which this lack of unity can be attributed to a failure of leadership.

Newspaper reports, like all historical documents, are not neutral presentations of objective fact but inevitably contain bias and selectivity, which must be taken into account when analysing their contents. The Irish Times, for example, tended to take a unionist stance, while the Sunday Independent and Irish Independent were sympathetic to nationalism but supportive of the Cumann na nGaedheal party during the Free State era. The Derry journal was also nationalist in its outlook, but critical of Cumann na nGaedheal. The differing attitudes that prevailed in different regions of Ireland also had an influence on what was published in the respective organs of the local press.

For this reason, the reports quoted in this article have been selected from a variety of geographical regions across Ireland and the newspapers they are taken from represent a variety of ideological positions – by this means it is hoped that a level of balance will be present in the conclusions arrived at from analysing their contents. Furthermore, most of the reports selected take the form of letters from readers or accounts of speeches given at the various events being reported on, rather than editorial comments or opinion pieces. 

CONTINUED IN NEXT POST
[1] F. Devine, Fintan Lane and Niamh Puirseil, Essays in Irish Labour History (Dublin and Portland, 2008), p. 3.

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